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This paper analyzes, in a set-up where only the control over ac-
tions is contractible, the rationale for delegation. An organization
must take two decisions. The payoffs are affected by a random
parameter and only the agent knows its realization. If the prin-
cipal delegates the control over the first decision to the agent,
his choice may indicate the information that he possesses. If the
principal retains control over the second decision, discovering this
information is valuable. Hence, this paper provides a new ratio-
nale for delegation: A transfer of control to the informed party
can be used to discover the private information. (JEL: D23, D82,
L22 , M41)
1 Introduction
This paper studies the problem of information transmission within an or-
ganization. We consider a repeated relationship between a better informed
agent and a principal (for convenience from here on, we will refer to the
principal as “she” and the agent as “he”). The organization must choose
two projects, decisions or actions, in sequence whose payoffs are affected by
a single random parameter. Initially, there is asymmetric information be-
tween the principal and the agent. The agent knows the realization of the
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parameter, while the principal does not. They also have diverging interests;
i.e., they do not agree on the optimal projects.
In a complete contracting set-up, the principal designs a revelation con-
tract that specifies the actions that the agent should take, and the corre-
sponding payments as a function of these. In this paper, we adopt the in-
complete contracting view of organizations and assume the projects, and the
underlying economic environment (the “state of the world”), cannot be con-
tracted upon, neither ex-ante nor ex-post. In the terminology of incomplete
contract theory, we consider the case of observable, but non-verifiable, deci-
sions. However we assume that control over projects can be contracted upon.
In our setting, the only feasible contracts are the ones stipulating who is in
charge of each project. At the beginning of the game, the principal allocates
the right to undertake project(s) either to herself or to the agent.1
In the absence of performance-based payments, the governance of the
decision-making process is crucial for the overall performance of an organi-
zation. The informational asymmetry can be overcome either directly (with
a message sent by the agent to the principal who then decides) or indirectly
(the actions of the agent allow the principal to discover the private informa-
tion which he possesses).
In our set-up these two alternatives are associated with two different orga-
nizational structures: “centralization” and “partial delegation”. This paper
compares these two organizational structures. It shows that the informa-
tion transfers are different in each case. In partial delegation, the principal
can learn the state parameter by observing the agent’s action while with
centralization the principal may remain imperfectly informed. Information
transfer is valuable for the principal if the relationship is a repeated one.
Thus the principal could prefer partial delegation to an agent with different
preferences rather than centralization because it enables her to discover the
agent’s private information.
In the case of centralization, the principal chooses both projects, and the
agent may transmit a message containing information about the actual state
of the world (for instance, the agent can be asked to advise the principal).
Given that the principal cannot build a revelation contract, the agent’s choice
of communication is strategic. He does not necessarily want to communicate
the true information. Instead he will communicate the information that best
1This kind of contract is called partial contracting by Aghion, Dewatripont and
Rey [2002].
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fits his interests when the principal selects the projects. Communication
under centralization is a cheap-talk game and, as shown by Crawford and
Sobel [1982], this kind of communication is noisy.
In the case of partial delegation, the principal delegates the choice of some
projects to the agent. By observing the agent’s choice in the first period, she
may acquire (part of) the agent’s superior information. The acquisition of
information is valuable for her only if she can use it to decide in the second
period and, therefore, delegation must be only partial. The principal gives
up control over the first period project, but keeps control over the second
period one.2 The delegation mechanism is costly for her. When she gives
up the right to decide, the agent does not implement her preferred decision.
Diverging interests between the parties create losses due to her lack of control
when she delegates. The principal’s lack of commitment means that the agent
cannot be punished for this.3
Our main result is that (partial) delegation is a mechanism to induce full
revelation by the better informed agent. We establish this result using an
appropriate equilibrium refinement, i.e., Cho and Kreps [1987] intuitive
criterion. When the principal cannot elicit the agent’s information through
communication, she can do it by giving up control over the first project.
Unlike in the complete contract framework, where the principal can control
the rents she leaves to the agent, in our mechanism there is loss of control as
soon as the principal gives power to the agent.4
Partial delegation can also be the optimal organizational structure. This
is true when information is not revealed in the message game and the losses
due to the lack of control are relatively small when compared to the bene-
fits of acquiring information. Hence the principal’s decision to choose either
centralized decision-making process or the one where the agent partially has
control depends on the value of the agent’s private information and the di-
vergence of interests between the two parties.
The work in this paper is based on the assumption that the decisions
(projects) cannot be described in a completely comprehensive contract. It
2Partial delegation is then a signaling game (Spence, [1973]).
3Roider [2006] shows that delegation could be optimal in a hold-up framework, in
which the information between parties is symmetric.
4With partial delegation, the principal learns the agent’s private information by giving
him control in the first period. This is in sharp contrast with the complete contract
literature result that information revelation could be delayed (the so-called ratchet effect),
see Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole [1985], Laffont and Tirole [1988].
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may be applicable to various forms of organizations and relationships. The
literature on strategic communication provides examples of relationships be-
tween parties with different information in which projects cannot be con-
tracted. Ottaviani [2000] studies the relationship between a better in-
formed financial advisor and an investor. Dessein [2002] andMorris [2001]
illustrate their models with examples from political science. To be precise,
one of Morris’s examples concerns a repeated relationship between a social
scientist (advisor) and a politician (decision-maker). The social scientist has
better knowledge of the state of the world and he is repeatedly asked to
advise the politician. We consider an alternative decision-making process in
which the scientist is asked by the politician to completely design a project
in his field of expertise. The politician then implements the project. In this
case, the scientist has the real authority over the decision even though he
does not have the formal authority.5 By delegating the project design to the
social scientist, the politician improves her knowledge of the field and she can
use it to take subsequent decisions. Aghion and Tirole [1997] also study
relationships in a context of asymmetric information where the allocation of
power is the only tool available. Clearly, all these examples could fit our
model.
In the literature the choice between delegation and centralization is often
a simple trade-off between losses due to the lack of control associated with
delegation and informational benefits, in cases where the delegate is better
informed than his supervisor. The benefits of a delegated structure may
include better communication (Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichel-
stein [1992]), better ability to prevent collusion (Laffont and Marti-
mort [1998] and Felli [1996]), an informed decision-maker (Legros [1993],
Dessein [2002], Ottaviani [2000]) or increased incentives provided to the
agent (Aghion and Tirole [1997]).
Most of these papers compare delegation and centralization, but they do
not consider delegation as a tool for transmitting information from the better
informed agent to his supervisor. Dessein [2002], Ottaviani [2000], and
Kra¨hmer [2006] consider a one period game where the principal can either
delegate the project choice to a better informed agent with biased prefer-
ences or take the decision herself and use the agent’s advice to improve her
knowledge of his private information. As in our framework, communication
under centralization is not fully informative. The decision to delegate, or not
5Aghion and Tirole [1997].
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to, depends on the trade-off between loss of control and loss of information.
Losses due to the lack of control occur when an informed agent has control,
losses due to the lack of information occur when the informed agent advises
the principal, who then chooses the project.6 Our paper introduces a second
period in this model, so that delegation becomes an instrument for obtaining
the agent’s hidden information. Legros [1993] integrates this dimension.
In his two period model, the principal delegates the first project choice to a
better informed agent chosen at random from a given set of agents. In the
second period, the principal can either re-select the same agent and let him
choose the second project or she can hire a new agent, chosen at random,
to implement the second decision. In this model, the first period decision
does not signal the agent’s private information (i.e., its type) perfectly to the
principal. This result differs from ours because in Legros’s model the agent
trades off the immediate benefit of implementing his preferred policy (re-
vealing his private information) against the probability of being re-selected,
which increases when he can convince the principal that his preferences are
close to hers. Hence, the first period decision is a not a perfect signal of the
agent’s type of information.
The paper is organized as follows: The model is presented in section 2.
The outcomes under delegation and centralization are described in sections
3 and 4. Section 5 compares the two organizational structures. The main
conclusions are in section 6.
2 The Model
Consider an organization composed of one principal and one agent. The
organization chooses two projects d1 and d2 at period t = 1 and t = 2,
respectively. The selection of a project affects the welfare of the principal and
the agent. Their utility levels are also affected by a common environmental
6Kra¨hmer [2006] shows that message-contingent delegation creates incentives for the
agent to disclose his private information in a context where the actions are not contractible.
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parameter, θ, which realizes before any choice is made.7,8
Environmental parameter The payoff of the project depends on the
economic environment. For simplicity, we assume that a state of the world
is fully described by a parameter, θ ∈ Θ = {θL, θH} , with θH > θL. The
agent knows the realization θ. The principal only knows Θ and the (common
knowledge) distribution F (θ). Then let vL be the probability of θ = θL and
let vH = (1− vL) . Moreover, let ∆θ = (θH − θL) . We briefly discuss the
extension to N > 2 states of the world in the conclusion.
Projects At each period t, the decision, dt, is the choice of a project to be
implemented by the organization, with dt ∈ (0,+∞) .
Allocation of the rights to choose the projects We assume that
projects can be observed by both parties, but cannot be contracted (using
the terminology of Tirole [1999], they are observable, but not verifiable).
As in Dessein [2002], the realization of θ cannot be contracted. Hence the
only variable agents can contract upon is the right to choose the projects d1
and d2. These control rights are allocated by the principal either to herself
(centralization) or to the agent (delegation).9
These contractual restrictions are consistent with the incomplete contract
view of organizations: To give authority to a subordinate agent means to give
him the right to make a decision within an allowed set (see, Simon [1958],
Grossman and Hart [1986], Hart and Moore [1988], Aghion and
Tirole [1997]).
There are four possible allocations of decision rights: The principal keeps
control over both projects (centralization), she delegates both choices, or the
7This is a simplification. Alternatively, we could assume that the state of the world
changes over periods and that there is some correlation between the states of the world in
the two periods. The results of the paper would remain qualitatively the same. The impor-
tant assumption is that the observation of the first decision (under delegation) improves
the information about the state of the world in the second period.
8This is a common assumption in dynamic models of incentive contracts. See, e.g.,
Laffont and Tirole [1988].
9The fact that the principal initially possesses decision rights over both projects can be
justified by her owning the physical assets which give her the right to decide about their
use (Grossman and Hart [1986]), or by institutional agreement, as in political decisions
(Aghion and Tirole [1997]).
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control rights are split between principal and agent (either d1 or d2 is dele-
gated). Partial delegation is when the better informed agent receives control
over d1 but not over d2. In our model, we concentrate mainly on centraliza-
tion and partial delegation. Complete delegation and partial delegation of
d2 will be discussed at the end of the paper.
Message Game After observing the state of the world, the agent may
reveal information by sending a message to the principal. This message may
cause the principal to update her prior beliefs and thus may affect her choice
of the projects.10 We allow A to send a message before each decision taken by
P. In cases of partial delegation we do not allow the agent to communicate.
Timing of the events
1. The principal (denoted by P) chooses between centralization and partial
delegation of d1.
2. The agent (denoted by A) observes the state of the world, θ.
3. Under Partial delegation,
(a) chooses d1, which is observed by P.
(b) P chooses d2.
3. Under centralization,
(a) A sends a message to P.
(b) P chooses d1.
(c) A sends a message to P.
(d) P chooses d2.
10It makes no difference whether messages are verifiable or unverifiable, because we do
not consider the case where the allocation of control rights could depend on messages (see
Kra¨hmer [2006] for the analysis of this case in a one-period model).
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Preferences P and A derive private benefits from each project. The pay-
offs of player P and A are represented by a quasi-concave Von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function UP (d1, d2, θ) and U
A(d1, d2, θ). We assume that
utility functions satisfy:
A1: Time-separability: For K = P,A:
UK(d1, d2, θ) = U
K
1 (d1, θ) + U
K
2 (d2, θ).
A2: Single peakedness: For t = 1, 2 and K = P,A, there exists a
unique dˆKt (θ) ≡ argmaxdt UK(dt, θ).








dˆAt (θH)− dˆPt (θH)
)
.
If the sign of these differences is positive (resp. negative), it means that at
period t, the agent systematically prefers a larger (resp. lower) project than
the principal.
A5: Increasing difference (ID): For t = 1, 2 andK = P,A: ∆UKt (dt) =
UKt (dt, θH)−UKt (dt, θL) increases in dt. This assumption is a standard sorting
condition in a framework with two states of the world.
Lemma 1 A2 and A5 imply that for t = 1, 2 and K = A,P , dˆKt (θH) >
dˆKt (θL).
Proof Single-peakedness implies that:
UKt (dˆ
K












From these conditions, one immediatly obtains:
(3) UKt (dˆ
K
t (θH), θH)−UKt (dˆKt (θH), θL) > UKt (dˆKt (θL), θH)−UKt (dˆKt (θL), θL),
or equivalently that: ∆UKt (dˆ
K




t (θL)). By A5, this implies
that dˆKt (θH) > dˆ
K
t (θL). Q.E.D.
In our set-up, there is a unique state-contingent preferred project for P
and A at each period t. However P and A disagree about which project is
the best one.
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Liquidity constraints We assume that the agent is liquidity constrained.
We can interpret this assumption as follows: The agent is liquidity con-
strained because of imperfect capital markets and so he cannot buy the or-
ganization with a pay-cut at the beginning of the relationship. Without this
hypothesis the problem has an easy solution: P is weakly better off if both A
and P can agree on an appropriate pay-cut and let A make both decisions.
This assumption is quite realistic, and is fairly common in the literature (see,
Zabojnik [2002] and Sappington [1983]). Our Proposition 4 shows how
and when an agent who is not liquidity constrained can improve the preferred
organizational structure of the principal.
3 Partial delegation
This section describes the projects chosen by the agent and the principal
when d1 is delegated and d2 is not. Under partial delegation, P observes A’s
decision before choosing d2. Given that A is better informed, his choice of
d1 may provide information to P. So P then revises her prior beliefs before
choosing the period 2 project and A will take this into account.
We adopt the standard equilibrium concept used in signalling games, i.e.,
the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (BNE).
Let BRA(d2) and BR
P (d1) be the best response correspondences of the
two players.
Definition 1 A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (BNE) is a strategy profile for
each player, (d∗1(.), d
∗
2(.)), such that
∀θ, d∗1(.) ∈ BRA(d∗2) ≡ argmax
d1










where posterior beliefs µ∗(θi|d∗1) are consistent with Bayes’ rule.
Signalling games usually have multiple equilibria. We use the intuitive
criterion (Cho and Kreps [1987]) to restrict the equilibrium set. The
intuitive criterion is a refinement of the out-of-equilibrium beliefs. A BNE
fails the intuitive criterion if the equilibrium strategies are not consistent
with the refined beliefs.
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Definition 2 Let A’s equilibrium payoff in state θ be UA
∗
(θ) = UA(d∗1, d
∗
2, θ).












A BNE fails the intuitive criterion if A’s equilibrium payoff in one state of
the world (θi) is greater with the equilibrium strategy d
∗
1 than with any other
strategy (condition (4)). Moreover, d1 must be such that A’s equilibrium
payoffs in the other state of the world (θj) are smaller than those with a d1
strategy, once P is convinced that d1 could not have been chosen by A in
state θi (condition (5)).
In the rest of this section we describe the outcome of the signalling game
played by the two individuals when P delegates d1. Results are summarized
in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Under partial delegation, the only equilibrium that survives
the intuitive criterion is the least costly separating (LCS) equilibrium (i.e.,
the Riley outcome11 ).
We prove this by considering the possible separating, pooling and partially
separating equilibria, and showing that only the Riley outcome survives, once
we require equilibria to satisfy the intuitive criterion. First we look at the
possible separating equilibria.12
Separating equilibria If the equilibrium is separating, by observing d∗1(.),
P learns θi. Then she selects her preferred project:




12In the analysis, we neglect the agent’s outside option (the individual rationality con-
straints) and assume that the agent’s equilibrium payoff is always higher than his outside
option. Thus a separating equilibrium always exists. Alternatively, if the total payoff
(UA+UP ) is positive and if P has liquidity, she can make an unconditional transfer to A,
which is equivalent to a decrease of his outside option.
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A strategy profile (d∗1(.), d
∗
2(.)) is a separating equilibrium if the following
incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied:
(7) UA1 (d
∗




2(θL), θL) ≥ UA1 (d∗1(θH), θL) + UA2 (d∗2(θH), θL),
(8) UA1 (d
∗




2(θH), θH) ≥ UA1 (d∗1(θL), θH) + UA2 (d∗2(θL), θH).
To determine the relevant constraint, we must first identify the state where
A could have an incentive to misrepresent his information. This may happen
in state θi only if the resulting period 2 decision satisfies:
(9) UA2 (d
∗
2(θj), θi) ≥ UA2 (d∗2(θi), θi).
A has, indeed, to make a suboptimal decision to misrepresent his information.
This behaviour is optimal for A only if P’s period 2 decision counterbalances
his losses in the first period.
Three mutually exclusive cases must be distinguished: (S1) condition
(9) is satisfied in state θL; i.e. if θL, A has a second period benefit if he
misrepresents his type; (S2) condition (9) is satisfied in state θH ; and (S3)
condition (9) is neither satisfied in θL nor in θH . The increasing difference
assumption rules out the case where (9) would have been satisfied in both
states.




2(θH), θL)− UA2 (d∗2(θL), θL) > 0.
By ID and lemma 1, if equation (9) is satisfied for θi = θL, then it is not
satisfied for θi = θH . So, in case S1, the relevant incentive constraint is given
by (7). This constraint could be equally well written as:
(11) UA1 (d
∗
1(θL), θL)− UA1 (d∗1(θH), θL) ≥ UA2 (d∗2(θH), θL)− UA2 (d∗2(θL), θL).
This means that, in state θL, A’s costs (in the first period) of mimicking
the behavior of A in state θH (given by the left-hand-side of equation (11))
are greater than the benefits he would have in the second period (given by
equation (10)).
P uses Bayes’s rule to update her beliefs. Thus at a separating equilib-
rium, µ(θL|d∗1(θL)) = 1 and µ(θL|d∗1(θH)) = 0. In (S1), the equilibrium is
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supported by beliefs µ(θL|d1) = 1,∀ d1 6= d∗1(θH). Given P’s beliefs, A selects




= dˆA1 (θL) if θi = θL





Given (10), it is easy to check that these are the only possible separating
equilibria in (S1).
We now use the intuitive criterion to select a unique equilibrium in D.
In state θH , consider a deviation by A from d
∗
1(θH) to d1 ∈ D. By definition
of D, such a deviation can benefit A only in state θH . So the intuitive
criterion demands that the beliefs associated with d1 ∈ D should be updated
to µ(θL|d1 ∈ D) = 0.
Thus at θH , a rational agent will select his preferred decision within D.
The only equilibrium surviving the intuitive criterion is the efficient sep-
arating equilibrium (the Riley outcome). If dˆA1 (θH) ∈ D, the Riley out-
come is d∗1(θ) = dˆ
A










In case S2, the relevant incentive constraint is (8). The set of separating
equilibria is:
d∗1(θi)
{ ∈ D′ ≡ {d1(θL)|(8) is satisfied} if θi = θL






And similarly, the intutive criterion selects the most efficient separating equi-
librium within this set.
In case S3, regarding period 2, the agent has no incentive to misrepresent







2 (θ) and µ
∗(θi|d∗1(θi) = 1. Applying the intuitive
criterion, all the separating equilibria except this one are eliminated.
Pooling equilibria One must bear in mind that if there is no revelation
the rationale for delegation disappears and the principal is better off making
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both decisions herself. We analyze pooling equilibria because it is important
to stress that none of them survives the intuitive criterion. Thus partial
delegation will always mean full revelation.
If A plays a pooling equilibrium, P does not obtain any information by
observing d∗1, and her period 2 choice is:




2 (d2, θL) + vHU
P
2 (d2, θH).
Given our assumptions, d∗2 is unique and d
∗
2 ∈ [dˆP2 (θL), dˆP2 (θH)].
As in the case of separating equilibria, we have to identify the state where
A hides his information. He prefers an uninformed P in state θi only if:
(19) UA2 (d
∗
2, θi) ≥ UA2 (dˆP2 (θi), θi).
This is because if A decides to hide his information he has to make a sub-
optimal decision in state θi. This behaviour is optimal only if the period 2
decision of P counterbalances A’s first period loss.
To define the out-of-equilibrium beliefs supporting the pooling equilib-
rium, it is important to identify the state of nature in which A has no interest
in revealing his private information. Thus once again we need to consider
three different cases: N1 (A prefers an uninformed P in state θL), N2 (A
prefers an uninformed P in state θH) and N3 (A always prefers an informed
P). Our assumptions on the preferences rule out the case in which the agent
prefers an uninformed principal in both states.
Consider the case N1. A may prefer an uninformed P in state θL only if
(20) UA2 (d
∗
2, θL) ≥ UA2 (dˆP2 (θL), θL).
By A4 and A5, if this condition holds, in state θH , the agent prefers an
informed principal, that is:
(21) UA2 (d
∗
2, θH) ≤ UA2 (dˆP2 (θH), θH).
To support the pooling equilibrium, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs must
be µ(θL|d1 6= d∗1) = 1.
We can now define the set of pooling equilibria as the set of d∗1 such
that A’s equilibrium payoffs in both states are greater than his payoffs if he
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deviate from the equilibrium. Obviously we only have to consider deviations
to A’s preferred project dˆA1 (θ).
In N1, the set of pooling equilibria is the set d∗1 such that:
UA1 (d
∗




2, θL) ≥ UA1 (dˆA1 (θL), θL) + UA2 (dˆP2 (θL), θL),(22)
UA1 (d
∗




2, θH) ≥ UA1 (dˆA1 (θH), θH) + UA2 (dˆP2 (θL), θH).(23)
We now apply the intuitive criterion to get rid of all the pooling equilibria.
Lemma 2 For each d∗1, there exists d˜1 such that:
(i) if θL, A prefers the pooling equilibrium d
∗
1 to d˜1, whatever the beliefs as-
sociated with d˜1.
(ii) if θH , A prefers d˜1 to the pooling equilibrium d
∗
1 if P believes that
µ(θL|d˜1) = 0.
The proof is in Appendix A.1.
Given Lemma 2, if θL, A will never deviate to d˜1. As a result, according to
the intuitive criterion, the beliefs associated with d˜1 should be µ(θL|d˜1) = 0.
However with these updated beliefs, if θH is realized, A prefers to quit the
pooling equilibrium (part (ii) of the Lemma). Thus the initial equilibrium
d∗1 does not survive the intuitive criterion.
Case N2 is identical to N1 and therefore omitted. In case N3, A prefers
an informed principal in both states. Hence, whatever the out-of equilibrium
beliefs, it is always profitable for the agent to deviate in at least one state
and no pooling equilibria can be sustained.
Partially separating equilibria In a partially separating equilibrium, in
one state, θi, the agent randomizes between two projects. In the other state,
θj, A chooses a project with probability one.
13 We will consider partially
separating equilibria in which, in state θj, A chooses his preferred project for
sure, that is d1(θj) = dˆ
A
1 (θj). And, in state θi, A chooses his preferred project
dˆA1 (θi) with probability q and the other type’s preferred project (dˆ
A
1 (θj)) with
the complement probability 1− q.14
The principal, when she observes dˆA1 (θi), correctly infers that the true
state of the world is θi and therefore chooses dˆ
P
2 (θi) in period 2. When she
13Our assumptions on preferences rule out the case where the agent randomizes in both
states.
14Other equilibria where agent does not choose his preferred project in state θj can be
eliminated in the same way.
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observes dˆA1 (θj), she revises her prior beliefs on θ to µi(q) = µ(θi|dˆA1 (θj)) =
vi(1−q)
vj+vi(1−q) . Given her knowledge at time 2, she selects the project that gives
her the highest utility:




2 (d2, θi) + (1− µi(q))UP2 (d2, θj).








2 (θi), θi) if he








2(µi(q)), θi) if he
chooses dˆA1 (θj). In a partially separating equilibrium, q must be such that,
in state θi, A achieves the same payoff with the two actions. Hence, the
equilibrium probability q∗ is given by the following equality:
(25) UA1 (dˆ
A














The equilibrium payoff of A in state θi is then given by (25). A partially
separating equilibrium exists, if (1) q∗ defined in (25) is in (0, 1) and (2)
the equilibrium payoff of the agent is greater than what he could obtain by
deviating which depends on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Partially separating
equilibria, when they exist, do not survive the intuitive criterion. To show
that, we proceed as for pooling equilibria. For convenience, the analysis is
relegated to appendix A.2.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 1, our key result. Given an ap-
propriate equilibrium concept, partial delegation entails full revelation.
In the case of partial delegation, given that the only surviving equilibrium
is separating, the principal does not need to rely on messages to become
informed. Thus with this organizational structure we can ignore cheap-talk
games, with no loss of generality.
4 Centralization
In a centralized mechanism, the principal can still acquire information by
simply asking the agent to provide it. Given that the projects and the state
of the world cannot be contracted upon, the principal cannot reward or
punish the agent if he does not transmit the true information. Thus in a
centralised mechanism communication is a cheap-talk game.
If the preferences are not time invariant, the agent could have different
incentives to transmit information at different times. Thus P could require A
to communicate his private information twice, before each of her decisions.
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Obviously, if A communicates the true information at t = 1, the second
message game is useless.
In these message games, A sends a message to P, who revises her beliefs
about θ before making her choice. Beliefs are updated according to Bayes’s
rule. We represent P’s knowledge of the state of the world after the message
game at period t by posterior beliefs Mt = (µL, µH) where µi, i = L,H is
the belief that θ=θi. We call M0 = (vL, vH), the prior beliefs.
In the centralized mechanism, P maximizes her utility according to the
knowledge she has available. At time t, P’s utility is maximized for




t (dt, θL) + µHU
P
t (dt, θH).
A chooses his message before each decision taken by P (according to (26)),
A chooses his message. Centralization is, thus, a four-stage game. For each
period there are two stages: Communication and decision.
In a cheap talk game, there is always a babbling equilibrium, where P
learns nothing.15 In addition to this uninformative equilibrium, there may be
a separating equilibrium where the agent sends the message mL if θ = θL and
mH if θ = θH . In such an equilibrium, the principal’s beliefs after receiving
the messages mL and mH are updated to respectively µL = µ(θL|mL) = 1
and µH = µ(θH |mH) = 1. Then, after observing this information, P chooses
her preferred project dˆPt (θ).
We now concentrate on the conditions that guarantee that there is an
informative equilibrium. There is such an equilibrium if the agent’s payoff
with the equilibrium message mi, i = L,H is larger than the payoff he could
obtain by deviating and sending the other message mj, j 6= i. By deviating,
the agent changes the principal’s decision from dˆPt (θi) to dˆ
P
t (θj).
Consider first the message game played before P chooses d1. There is
a separating equilibrium if in both states A has a higher payoff when P
implements dˆPt (θi), for t = 1, 2, in state θi than when P implements dˆ
P
t (θj),
for t = 1, 2, in state θi. Thus there is a separating equilibrium if the following
15Crawford and Sobel [1982].
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If these conditions hold, the agent in state θi is better off if he sends message
mi than if he deviates to message mj . Hence, (27) and (28) guarantee that
there is an informative equilibrium before P chooses d1.
Next, suppose that these conditions do not hold. The agent will thus
not transmit his private information before the choice of the first project.
However after the principal has chosen d1 = d
∗
1(M0), the agent may wish to
disclose the true value of θ before P chooses d2. A separating equilibrium




t (θL), θL) ≥ UAt (dˆPt (θH), θL),(29)
UAt (dˆ
P
t (θH), θH) ≥ UAt (dˆPt (θL), θH).(30)
Anticipating that information will be disclosed at t = 2, when these two
conditions hold, the agent may wish to reveal the information before, if both
(29) and (30) are also satisfied at t = 1. But this necessarily implies that (27)
and (28) are satisfied. We end up with two sets of conditions that guarantee
that there is a separating equilibrium at t = 1 and at t = 2.
We may then have two equilibria, information and no information. The
equilibrium played has an important impact on the principal’s decision on
whether to delegate or not. P will certainly not delegate the project choice to
A if she expects that information will be revealed if she retains control. Hence
the equilibrium selected by the agent is crucial to understand the decision of
the principal on whether to delegate or not.
Likewise, the type of equilibrium played by the agent has an influence
on his associated payoff. If there are two equilibria, we can assume that the
agent plays the separating equilibrium if this Pareto dominates the babbling
equilibrium. This means that, if in both states, A has a higher payoff if he
sends a state dependent message than if he leaves P uninformed, then he
chooses to play the informative equilibrium.
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2 (θL), θL) ≥ UA2 (d∗2(M0), θL),(33)
UA2 (dˆ
P
2 (θH), θH) ≥ UA2 (d∗2(M0), θH).(34)
Proposition 2 With centralization there is an informative equilibrium at
t = 1 and it Pareto dominates the uninformative equilibrium if conditions
(27), (28), (31) and (32) hold. There is an informative equilibrium at t =
2 and it Pareto dominates the uninformative equilibrium if conditions (29),
(30), (33) and (34) hold.
If only (27) and (28) hold, the informative equilibrium exists but it does
not dominate the uninformative one; this is also true if only (29) and (30)
hold. In these cases, it is not possible to rank the equilibria with the Pareto
criterion. We will not make assumptions on which equilibrium is being play
in these circumstances. But, in the example developed in the next section,
we will show that there is room for partial delegation even if the agent plays
the separating equilibrium whenever it exists. Hence, delegation within orga-
nizations does not depend on the equilibrium selection in the message game.
To summarize: in the centralized mechanism, either (a) the principal
acquires the true information at t = 1, or (b) at t = 2, or (c) the principal
acquires information neither at t = 1 nor at t = 2. Depending on the
information she has available, P implements either her preferred project dˆPt (θ)
or d∗t (M0). Unlike in the case of partial delegation, under centralization P
will not always become informed. Free communication from A to P does not
guarantee that P always learns the state of the world.
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5 Comparisons of organizational structures
We have just established that the information transmission process could
have different results with the two organizational structures. The aim of
this section is to determine if (and when) partial delegation is the optimal
organizational structure for the principal. - We use an example to show that
(1) communication may fail and (2) P may optimally transfer control over the
first decision to A. This means that when the agent does not communicate,
the loss of control associated with delegation is small when compared to the
benefits of the information obtained.
5.1 An example









. These preferences are time invariant and satisfy As-
sumptions A1 to A5. A’s preferred project at time t is dˆAt (θ) = (α + θ),
while P’s preferred project is dˆPt (θ) = (β+ θ). We suppose that A has a bias
toward larger projects, that is α > β.
Partial delegation Following Proposition 1, under partial delegation the
only equilibrium surviving the intuitive criterion is the Riley outcome. In our
example, to compute it, we need to identify the relevant incentive constraint.
In a separating equilibrium, P’s decision at t = 2 is d∗2(θ) = dˆ
P
2 (θ) = (β + θ).
Since α > β, if θH , A prefers to signal his type. The relevant incentive
constraint is then given by (7) and this defines the set of separating equilibria.
Applying the intuitive criterion, the Riley outcome is:
d∗1(θL) = dˆ
A
1 (θL) = α+ θL,(35)
d∗1(θH) =
{
dˆA1 (θH) = α+ θH , if ∆θ ≥ α− β,
α+ θL +
√




2 (θ) = β + θ.(37)
Centralization In the centralized mechanism, P maximizes her utility
given her knowledge. At time t, given beliefs Mt = (µL, µH), P’s utility
is maximized for d∗t = (β + µLθL + µHθH). With preferences time invariant,
either all information is transmitted at t = 1 or the messages are completely
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noisy. The following lemma derives the condition for the existence of infor-
mative equilibrium and for Pareto dominance.
Lemma 3 There is informative equilibrium in the message game if and only
if (α− β) ≤ ∆θ
2
. This equilibrium Pareto dominates the pooling equilibrium
if and only if (α− β) ≤ vH∆θ
2
.
Proof These conditions correspond to condition (27), (28), (31) and (32)
Q.E.D.
Comparisons If A reveals his private information in the message game,
centralization dominates since it allows the principal to select her preferred
project dˆPt (θ) in both periods. If A does not reveal his information in the
message game, P faces the following trade-off: either she remains uninformed
and take decisions on her own or she delegates d1 and both decisions are taken
by an informed party (A at t = 1, P at t = 2) but, in the first period, the
decision-maker is biased. Thus the question of choosing centralization or
partial delegation depends on weighing the value of the information acquired
against the losses due to lack of control.
Lemma 4 Partial delegation is preferred to uninformed centralization if
(38) (α− β)2 ≤ 2vLvH∆θ2.
Equation (38) is easily interpreted: Its left hand side represents the loss
of control, its right hand side the value of the information. Loss of control
can be expressed as the difference between P’s expected utility when she





1 (θ), θ) − EΘUP1 (dˆA1 (θ), θ) = (α − β)2. The value of information is
the difference in P’s expected utility when her decision is based on the true
state θ rather than on her prior knowledge. Without knowing θ, P selects the
decision d∗t (M0) = (β+vLθL+vHθH). At each period t, information increases




t (θ), θ)− EΘUPt (d∗t (M0), θ) = vLvH∆θ2. Hence, (α −
β)2 is the lost utility due to a biased agent and 2vLvH∆θ
2 is the benefit of
having an informed decision-maker in both periods. Note that when partial
20
delegation is preferred to uninformed centralization, the agent selects his
preferred project dˆA1 (θ) at t = 1.
16 To sum up, we have:









Partial delegation dominates when ∆θ is not large enough to reveal in-
formation in the message game, but large enough to have the benefits of











































Figure 1: The efficient organizational structure.
Note that if we assume that the agent plays the separating equilibrium
in the message game whenever it exists, that is when (α− β) ≤ ∆θ
2
, we
find again a non-empty parameter space where partial delegation is efficient.
More precisely, partial delegation is efficient for (α−β)√
2vLvH
≤ ∆θ ≤ 2(α − β).




The main reason for a transfer of control is not that the agent is better
informed, but that information will be transmitted if he has control. Figure
16There are additional loss of control if, to signal his type, A does not select his preferred
project.
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1 shows how differences in the structure of A’s private information result
in different organizations, with different levels of success. Some manage to
acquire information at no cost, some should delegate and suffer the loss of
control to acquire information and some should prefer to remain uninformed.
5.2 Complete delegation and partial delegation of d2
So far we have concentrated only on two organizational structures: Partial
delegation and centralization. There are, however, two other possible allo-
cations of the decision rights: Complete delegation and partial delegation of
d2. In both these structures, there is no information transfer. As we can
see from the above example, it is clear that these two structures are never
optimal.
Consider first complete delegation. If the agent controls the two decisions,
he chooses his preferred project dˆAt (θ) in each period t. Compared to partial
delegation, this leads to a duplication of the loss of control as the agent also
implements dˆA1 (θ) when he controls the first decision.
So complete delegation can only dominate partial delegation when in
the latter situation (1) the agent chooses a decision d∗1(θ) which is not his
preferred project and (2) the principal prefers dˆA1 (θ) to d
∗
1(θ). In this case,
there is an extra loss of control at t = 1 under partial delegation and the
effects of this must be compared to the extra loss of control at t = 2 under
complete delegation. If these two conditions are satisfied, complete delegation
may emerge as the optimal organizational structure. However as we can see
from the above example, the second condition is never satisfied, and complete
delegation is always dominated by partial delegation.
Consider next partial delegation of d2. This organization could emerge if
there is large disagreement at t = 1 so that partial delegation is not consid-
ered an efficient outcome and, in period t = 2, the preferences of the agent
and the principal are more congruent. In the example, with preferences which
do not change over time, delegation of d2 is always dominated.
5.3 The role of limited liability constraint
Finally, suppose that the agent is not liquidity constrained and that he can
buy control over both decisions at the beginning of the relationship, i.e.
before he learns θ. We call EΘU
K∗ the expected payoff of player K = A,P
under the preferred organizational structure. Both parties are better off if
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t (θ), θ)− ω ≥ EΘUA∗.(40)
We use now the functional forms of our example to discover the conditions
in which the absence of liquidity constraint can make both parties better off,
i.e., the conditions to have an ω that satisfies (39) and (40).
Proposition 4 It is only when the preferred organizational structure is un-
informed centralization that an agent who is not liquidity constrained can
increase the welfare of both parties.
Proof (1) When the preferred organization is informed centralization,
EΘU
A∗ = 2[α(β + vLθL + vHθH)− β2/2] and EΘUP∗ = 2[β(vLθL + vHθH) +
β2/2]. Replacing in (39) and (40), we have:








Clearly, with a cut-off pay of ω = (α−β)
2
2
, for both parties there is no difference
between informed centralization and an organization where the agent buys
the control over the two decisions. This is because total welfare does not
increase when the agent buys control.
(2) Similarly, when the preferred organization is partial delegation, if A
buys control, he cannot increase total welfare. Hence both parties cannot be
absolutely better-off
(3) When the preferred organization is uninformed centralization, condi-








2 + (α− β)2).(44)
These two equations define the set of ω such that the agent can improve the
utility of both parties if he buys the organization from the principal at the
beginning of the relationship. Q.E.D.
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6 Conclusions
Our paper provides a new justification for delegation: In repeated interac-
tions, the delegation of control to the agent results in full revelation of his
private information. Thus partial delegation is an instrument that can be
used inside an organization in order to discover information. We establish
this result in three steps. First, we show that information is fully revealed
when the agent gets control. Next, we show that message games may not be
informative. Finally we show that, when direct communication fails, partial
delegation may be the optimal organizational structure for the principal.
This result means that in different decision processes -centralized or par-
tially delegated- an agent has different incentives to transmit his private in-
formation to his superior. To be more precise, we have shown that the agent
is more likely to transmit information if he has effective control over the de-
cision than if he is simply required to communicate his piece of information
in a centralized decision making process. The reason for this difference is
that misrepresenting his type of information is free in a message game while
it is costly when the agent controls the decision. In other words, information
transfer is more effective when the agent can suffers utility loss if he does not
signal his type.
We make three important assumptions in our analysis: We restrict the
preferences to a certain class of functions, we consider only two values for
the state of the world parameter and we assume that P can commit on a
given organizational structure at the beginning of the game. We analyse the
implications of each of these assumptions in turn.
With regard to preferences, we consider single peaked utility functions
with the principal and the agent diverging on their preferred project. The
systematic bias assumption (A4) also implies that at time t, in both states,
the agent prefers either a larger scale or a lower-scale project than the prin-
cipal. These assumptions on preferences guarantee possible congruence of
interests between the principal and the agent. To be more precise, we assume
that in at least one state the agent is better-off if he manages to transmit the
true situation to the principal. This does not guarantee that the information
will be transmitted in equilibrium and we have shown that it is, indeed, not
always the case. But, since our focus is on the possibility of transferring in-
formation, either through communication or through a transfer of control, we
24
require that, in at least one state, the agent prefers an informed principal to
an uninformed one. We are then able to show that information transmission
is the only outcome of partial delegation, even if, in the other state, the agent
would have been better off if information were not disclosed. In this respect,
assumptions A4 and A5 are important for our results to hold. By contrast,
if the agent is always better off if he manages to hide his private informa-
tion, information will never be transmitted and our rationale for delegation
disappears.
Our model considers two values for the state of the world parameter. In a
more general setting, with N states of the world, the main result still holds:
Only the Riley outcome survives the intuitive criterion when signals are free,
i.e., if the agent’s preferred project belongs to the set of separating equilib-
ria. When signals are costly, the intuitive criterion is not strong enough to
eliminate all the pooling equilibria and the equilibrium under delegation may
involve some degree of pooling. However, with N states of the world, the
argument is similar, even though there is some pooling. We show that one
rationale for delegation is information revelation and that, as long as there
is some revelation17, delegation still brings benefits. In these cases the infor-
mation received by the principal is incomplete, but she can still use what she
has to make her choice in the second period. Moreover, with N states of the
world communication is noisy, and the principal should not expect the agent
to communicate his private information in the cheap-talk game (Crawford
and Sobel [1982] and Dessein [2002]). Thus, when communication fails or
is imperfect, delegation may still allow her to discover the agent’s hidden in-
formation. More complex mechanisms mixing communication and delegation
may also emerge in this context.18
Our analysis assumes that the principal can decide on a given organiza-
tional structure at the beginning of the game. If we relax this hypothesis,
then in a case of partial delegation, the agent may play a pooling equilib-
rium in order to receive control in period 2. Hiding information in the first
period may be optimal for the agent, if he can make the principal give him
control and thus implement his preferred project at date 2. Without com-
17This situation occurs when not all the N types pool on the same decision.
18For instance, the first project is delegated, while before undertaking the second project,
the agent can send some message to the principal. This mechanism doesn’t change any-
thing in the two types case because under partial delegation the information is fully trans-
mitted at t = 1. In a more general information structure, this mechanism can potentially
be preferred to partial delegation and centralization.
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mitment, a pooling equilibrium can survive the intuitive criterion because,
unlike in the case of commitment, in both states the agent has an incentive
to misrepresent his type of information. Hence, two equilibria may coexist
under partial delegation: A pooling equilibrium where the agent hides his
information and receives control at date 2 and the separating equilibrium
described in Proposition 1. If the principal anticipates that the agent will
play a pooling equilibrium at date 1, she will not give up control in the first
period. Thus, if there is no commitment to the organizational structure,
partial delegation of d2 may be the optimal organizational structure. Lack
of commitment could drastically change the organizational structure.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Restating Lemma 2, to each d∗1, we can associate a d˜1 such that:
UA1 (d
∗




2, θL) ≥ UA1 (d˜1, θL) + UA2 (X, θL),(A1)




2 (θH), θH) ≥ UA1 (d∗1, θH) + UA2 (d∗2, θH),(A2)





Assume that there exists d˜1 such that:













(A4) d˜1 > dˆ
A
1 (θH).
Given such a value of d˜1, in θH , A is indifferent between the pooling equi-
librium (d∗1, d
∗
2) and (d˜1, dˆ
P
2 (θH)). Therefore, part (ii) of the Lemma is sat-
isfied.19 Given that, in θH , A prefers to signal his type, the function on the
right hand side of (A3) is a vertical translation of the one on the left hand
side. Therefore, d˜1 always exists (actually two values d˜1 satisfy (A3) by the
single peak assumption. We select those on the right of dˆA1 (θH)). Figure 2
illustrates the selection of d˜1 (and shows its existence).
Now, we focus on part (i). This condition is satisfied if (A1) holds what-
ever the beliefs associated with the observation of d˜1. First of all, notice that,































Figure 2: d˜1 defined by equations (A3) and (A4).
If the beliefs associated with d˜1 are µ(θL|d˜1) = 1 (X = dˆP2 (θL)), in θL,








2 (θL), θL) <
UA2 (d
∗
2, θL) by definition of case N1. Hence, (25) is satisfied.
If the beliefs associated with d˜1 are µ(θL|d˜1) = vL (X = d∗2), (A1) is also













If the beliefs associated with d˜1 are µ(θL|d˜1) = 0 (X = dˆP2 (θH)), (A1)
is satisfied for sure if A loses in both periods, that is if UA2 (dˆ
P




If this last condition is not satisfied, there is as before a first period cost




2 (θH), θL)− UA2 (d∗2, θL) > 0.
We now use the increasing difference assumption to show that the pool-
ing equilibrium does not survive the intuitive criterion. Since d˜1 > d
∗
1 and
dˆP2 (θH) > d
∗
2, ID implies that:





2 (θH), θH)− UA2 (d∗2, θH) > UA2 (dˆP2 (θH), θL)− UA2 (d∗2, θL).
(A3) and (A7) imply:
(A8) UA2 (d
∗
2, θL)− UA2 (dˆP2 (θH), θL) > UA1 (d˜1, θH)− UA1 (d∗1, θH).
(A6) and (A8) together imply:
(A9) UA2 (d
∗
2, θL)− UA2 (dˆP2 (θH), θL) > UA1 (d˜1, θL)− UA1 (d∗1, θL).
Rearranging the terms in this last equation, we obtain (A1). Hence, our
candidate d˜1 satisfies both conditions of Lemma 2.
A.2 Elimination of partially separating equilibria
Consider the partially separating equilibrium in which A randomizes in state
θL. A selects in state θL his preferred project dˆ
A
1 (θL) with probability q
∗,
defined in (25) for i = L and j = H, and dˆA1 (θH) with probability 1− q∗. In
state θH , A selects dˆ
A
1 (θH) with probability one.
This constitutes an equilibrium if the equilibrium payoff of A in state θL
is higher than what he could obtain by deviating. Consider a deviation to
dˆA1 (θL) + . The associated payoff depends on P’s beliefs about dˆ
A
1 (θL) + .
Beliefs could be either µ(θL|dˆA1 (θL) + ) = vL or µ(θL|dˆA1 (θL) + ) = 1. In the




1 (θL) + , θL) +
UA2 (d
∗
2, θL) where d
∗
2 is given by (18). In the latter case, the deviation payoff is
UA1 (dˆ
A




2 (θL), θL). In the sequel, we suppose that the out-
of-equilibrium beliefs are those associated with the highest deviation payoff,
though the argument developed below generalizes to the other case.
Suppose that the above partially separating equilibrium exists. We use
the following lemma, which establishes that the partially separating equilib-
rium does not survive the intuitive criterion.
Lemma 5 There exists d˜1 such that:
(i) if θL, A prefers the partially separating equilibrium to d˜1, whatever the
beliefs associated with d˜1.
(ii) if θH , A prefers d˜1 to the partially separating equilibrium if P believes
that µ(θL|d˜1) = 0.
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Proof Define d˜1 as:














(A11) d˜1 > dˆ
A
1 (θH),
where µ(q∗) = (µL(q∗), µH(q∗)). We know from the proof of lemma 2 that
such a d˜1 exists. By definition d˜1 satisfies part (ii) of the lemma.
We must then show that the equilibrium payoff of A in state θL is higher
than the payoff associated with a deviation to d˜1 whatever the beliefs asso-
ciated with. If the beliefs are µ(θL|d˜1) = 1, the equilibrium payoff is clearly
higher. Otherwise, it would have been profitable for A to deviate to dˆA1 (θL)+
which would have broken the equilibrium.
We must then only consider the case in which µ(θL|d˜1) = 0. In this case,





2 (θL), θL) > 0. We assume now that this condition is satisified.
By definition of q∗, the equilibrium payoff of A is
UA1 (dˆ
A




2 (θL), θL) =(A12)
UA1 (dˆ
A






To prove the lemma, we must show that
(A13) UA1 (dˆ
A










Since d˜1 > dˆ
A
1 (θH) and dˆ
P
2 (θH) > d
∗
2(µ(q
∗)), ID implies the following:
(A14) UA1 (d˜1, θH)− UA1 (d˜1, θL) > UA1 (dˆA1 (θH), θH)− UA1 (dˆA1 (θH), θL),
UA2 (dˆ
P




∗)), θH)− UA2 (d∗2(µ(q∗)), θL).




∗))− UA2 (dˆP2 (θH), θH) > UA1 (d˜1, θL)− UA1 (dˆA1 (θH), θL).




∗))− UA2 (dˆP2 (θH), θH) < UA2 (d∗2(µ(q∗)), θL)− UA2 (dˆP2 (θH), θL).
Combining these two equations, we obtain (A13). Hence, our candidate
d˜1 satisfies both conditions of Lemma 5. Then, the partially separating
equilibrium does not survive the intuitive criterion. Q.E.D.
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With a similar argument, the partially separating equilibrium in which A
randomizes in state θH can also be eliminated.
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